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Abstract
This paper uses subjects’ self-reported justiﬁcations to explain discrep-
ancies between observed heterogeneous behavior and the unique equilib-
rium prediction in a one-shot traveler’s dilemma experiment (TD). Princi-
p a lc o m p o n e n t s( P C )a n a l y s i ss u g g e s t st hat iterative reasoning, aspiration
levels, competitive behavior, attitudes towards risk and penalties and focal
points may be behind diﬀerent choices. Such reasons are coherent with
same subjects’ behavior in other tests and experiments in which these par-
ticular issues are prominent. Overall, we identify types of subjects whose
motivations are consistent across tasks.
Keywords: traveler’s dilemma, self-reports, principal components, exper-
iments.
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11 Introduction
The traveler’s dilemma (TD) is one of the classic examples used to highlight discrep-
ancies between the concept of rationality in Game Theory and the way real individuals
take strategic decisions. As such, its intuitive outcome and the game theoretic predic-
tion do not coincide. It was  rst introduced by Basu [3] to point out that discrepancies
between game theoretic reasoning and actual behavior may not only occur due to
problems with backwards induction, as it also may occur in single shot games.1
T h eo r i g i n a lf o r m u l a t i o no ft h eT Di sa sf o l l o w s :
“Two travelers lose their luggage during a  ight. Each travelers’ luggage
contains exactly the same object. To compensate for damages, the airline
m a n a g e ra s k se a c ht r a v e l e rt oi n d e p e n d e n t l ym a k eac l a i mf o rt h ev a l u eo f
the lost object between  and  To discourage false claims, the manager
o ers to pay each traveler the minimum of the two claims, plus a reward of
 to the lowest claimant and minus a penalty of  to the highest claimant.”
All standard game theoretic solution concepts predict that both players will select
the lowest possible choice  and thus, the predicted outcome will be (). This is the
unique Nash equilibrium, the unique strict equilibrium, the unique strong equilibrium
and the only rationalizable equilibrium. Yet, it seems intuitive that subjects may play
di erently since, for example, if they believe others will make high claims, choosing
higher s is bene cial for both subjects. Previous experimental evidence (Capra et al.
[9], Capra et al. [10], Goeree and Holt [17]) shows that a signi cant proportion of
experimental subjects choose values which are higher than the equilibrium prediction
and that the size of the penalty () in uences choices. In particular, lower penalties
are associated to higher choices. Becker et al. [8] show that even a large proportion of
experts in Game Theory do not choose according to the Nash prediction when playing
an anonymous electronic version of the TD among them. Therefore, ignorance on
how to reason in game theoretic terms cannot be the only reason behind the observed
heterogeneous choices in TD experiments.
Previous theoretical attempts have focused on explaining convergence to the Nash
prediction after repeated play in the TD.2 However, we are interested in explaining the
1“The traveler’s dilemma seems to be one of the purest embodiments of the paradox of rationality
in game theory, because it eschews all unnecessary features, like play over time or the nonstrictness
of the equilibrium”. (Basu, [3]).
2For example, Capra et al. [10] rationalize observed behaviour in repeated versions of the game
through a learning process in a probabilistic choice model in which players update their beliefs about
rivals while using a noisy best response.
2underlying motivations behind subjects’ intuitive and heterogeneous choices and thus
we focus on initial play.3
Rubinstein [18], in a one-shot not rewarded TD experiment with an extensive sam-
ple, studies subjects’ time responses under the hypothesis that more cognitive demand-
ing choices take longer to be taken. Results con rm this hypothesis, although most
non-extreme choices remain unexplained. We take a complementary approach in the
aim to understand all heterogeneous behavior.
We asked for subjects’ self-reported justi cations of their choices in the TD. This
approach is similar to Protocol Analysis, which has proven to be successful in psy-
chological studies.4 However, an structured use of variables emerging from unpaid
questionnaires is far from being standard in economic experiments.5 We  nd that not
only choices are heterogeneous, but that alleged reasons behind those di erent choices
in the TD are also consistently heterogeneous. Given such heterogeneity, we approach
the TD as an ideal candidate to study di erent motivations behind subjects’ experi-
mental choices. We use independent research assistants to codify subjects’ self-reports
into variables and we then use principal components analysis (PC) in order to rational-
ize choices in the TD and classify subjects according to their most prominently alleged
reasons. We  nd that some classic experimental issues such as cognitive complexity,
payo  aspirations, social preferences, risk and penalty aversion and focal points are
closely related to alleged reasons in our TD experiment.
We also took independent measures of same subjects’ personal characteristics and
behavior in other tasks and experiments. In particular and with respect to subjects’
characteristics, we obtained subjects’ scores in a GRE-type math test, subjects’ self-
evaluation in academic activities and gender. With respect to experimental measures,
we obtained how much they give in a dictator game experiment and their choices when
facing uncertainty in two di erent tasks. Given the intuitive relationship between sub-
jects’ self-reported justi cations in the TD and these other measures, we check whether
subjects prominently motivated by one particular feature in the TD also score high in
the particular task or experiment designed to check such feature. For example, we study
whether subjects reporting more cognitively complex reasoning procedures in the TD
score high in the GRE-type test or whether subjects using antisocial justi cations in
the TD give less in dictator games. We obtain coherent and consistent relationships
between both types of measures. Overall, we conclude that there exists di erent types
3Crawford [14] argues that by foregoing repetition as a teaching device, one-shot experiments place
a heavier burden on subjects’ understanding, with a premium on simplicity and clarity of design.
4See Austin and Delaney [2], Crutcher [15] and Ericsson and Simon [16].
5There exists however an increasing tendency in Economics to use subjects’ self-reports to explain
laboratory choices and go beyond using this information as just anecdotal evidence. A successful
example is Apesteguia et al.[1]
3of subjects whose  rst intuitive response to a strategic situation are driven by di erent
motivations and that such motivations are relatively consistent across tasks.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental design and
describes subjects’ choices in the TD. Section 3 explains how PCs were extracted from
subjects’ self-reported comments. Section 4 shows how PCs explain subjects’ choices
in the TD. Section 5 studies the relationship between PCs and subjects’ choices in
other tasks and experiments. Section 6 concludes. Appendices contain instructions
and data.
2 Experimental Design, Procedures and Results
The complete set of experimental data reported in this paper was collected during the
spring semester 2005 in several sessions with  rst year Economics students at Univer-
sidad de Granada (Spain). Subjects were informed that the number of experimental
points obtained during each of the sessions in which they would participate contributed
to their  nal grade in their Microeconomics I course in the following way: the student
in each of four sections who obtained the highest number of experimental points in to-
tal during the term would add three extra points (out of ten) to her  nal grade. Other
subjects’ grade depended on how close their performance was to the winner’s in their
section. Subjects were not informed of their performance and others’ performances in
any of the experiments and tasks until all experiments had concluded.6
The sequence of experiments carried out by subjects was as follows: a dictator
game (March), a GRE-type math test (beginning of April), risk aversion experiments
(end of April), and the session detailed below containing four tasks (June). Data
from all sessions were gathered and added to an ongoing database at Universidad de
Granada which contains information about subjects’ behavior across experiments and
their academic performance.
The  nal experimental sessions referred above (June) contained the traveler’s dilemma
experiment and are thus the main focus of this paper. In these sessions subjects per-
formed four tasks: ) predict their relative performance in the  nal Microeconomics I
exam with respect to other students in their class; ) decide between a binary lottery
and the outcome of a 2x2 game in which they played; )c h o o s ean u m b e ri naT D
and give an explanation for their decision and ) predict their overall performance in
6Grade rewards allowed us to mitigate order e ects by informing subjects of their results once
all tasks had ended, which may not have been credible had we used monetary rewards. Rubinstein
[18], in a TD experiment with no rewards reports a similar percentage of non-equilibrium choices to
previous TD experiments with monetary rewards. Brañas-Garza [7] compares monetary rewards with
grade points in Dictator Games and shows that extra-credit reward mechanisms increases subjects’
payo -maximizing behavior.
4the courses taken during that term.
Experimental procedures for these  nal sessions were as follows: Once in the class-
room and during the usual time slot for Microeconomics I, students were handed in-
structions for the four tasks. They were asked to perform the tasks in no particular
order. With respect to the TD, they were informed that they had been randomly
matched with another student from the same group. They were handed instructions
and asked to choose a number in the interval [20120] to which we will refer as their
choice (). They were also asked to voluntarily provide written comments -on the same
answer sheet- on how they had reached their decision. After one hour, students handed
back the answer sheets for all four tasks and left. Students were informed about their
performance in all experimental sessions at the end of the course and graded accord-
ingly, once all experiments had  nished.
The TD was framed as two  rms competing in prices, such that the content of the
experiment could be used to explain oligopolistic competition in subsequent Microeco-
nomics courses.7 Notice that at the time of the experiment, subjects had received no
lectures on oligopolistic competition nor on Game Theory. It is true that the frame may
have not only a ected subjects’ choices but also their reasoning process, and thus the
reasons behind our results may not perfectly apply to the TD but to a game with our
frame. In any case, results below show that the distribution of heterogeneous choices
was clearly similar to the usually obtained results in TD experiments with neutral
frame. Thus, our experiment may help us study the same failures of rationality as in
the original TD.
There were 243 subjects participating in the experimental sessions containing the
TD; 241 turned in an answer for the TD game, although 3 subjects answered with an
interval instead of a number so that these three observations were eliminated, leaving
238 valid observations of the TD.
There were two treatments varying in the size of the penalty  in the TD. Students
in three groups (184 subjects) were assigned to the treatment with penalty size  =2 0 ,
while students in the fourth group (54 subjects) faced a penalty  =5 .8
Figure 1 shows the distribution of subjects’ choices in the TD for the two penalty
sizes.
7The game is similar to a Bertrand duopoly in which  rms have to choose prices from a given
set. The analogy is not perfect since in our game, the  rm choosing the lowest price does not sell to
the whole market. However, it is su ciently close to a duopoly model in which there is some product
di erentiation. In any case, few subjects mentioned the duopoly framing and subjects’ explanations
indicate that they understood the strategic situation they were facing.
8Previous experiments with the TD show that the Nash equilibrium is a relatively better prediction
with high incentives (high ). Our highest penalty ( =20) provides relatively lower incentives than
the highest penalty in previous experiments designed to study how behavior changes with the penalty
size (Capra et al. [10]). We did so expecting to obtain more heterogenous choices in the TD.
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Although a signi cant percentage of subjects made Nash Equilibrium choices (c=20),
a higher proportion of subjects in both treatments made di erent choices (65% with
p =5 , 71% with p =2 0 ). The distribution is similar to previous experimental tests of
the TD and shows three peaks: ) the Equilibrium prediction ( =2 0 ), ) choices
around the average of the interval (c =7 0 ), and ) the highest possible number
(c =1 2 0 ). The higher percentage of equilibrium choices may be partially explained
by the Bertrand duopoly framing.9 A Mann-Whitney test comparing the distributions
under both penalty sizes shows that they are not statistically di erent (z =  0968,
p   value =0 33) and thus we conclude that the size of the penalty made no di er-
ence.10
In sum, as in previous experiments on the TD, we observe a high percentage of
non-equilibrium heterogeneous choices. In the following section we turn to subjects’
own explanations of their behavior to study whether there were also heterogeneous
reasons driving these choices.
3 Principal Components analysis
Codi cation of subjects’ comments into variables
Our aim was to use an independent, systematic and judgement-free method to codify
in a standard response format the comments voluntarily written by subjects after they
had played the TD. We asked two independent research assistants to help us in this
task.
First, we started by reading subjects’ comments. We de ned 26 ternary variables
taking values {012} and referring to the content in subjects’ comments and its sign.
9Suetens and Potters [21] review the experimental evidence on Betrand duopoly and  nd that
Bertrand produces more collusive behavior than Cournot.
10Capra et al. [10] show changes in the distribution when varying the penalty size, but penalty
changes were much more pronounced (from 5 units to 80 units, when choices could be made in the
interval [80200]). Rubinstein [18] uses a single hypothetical $5 penalty when choices are made in a
[180300] interval.
6If a subject’s comment did not contain any information on a particular variable, such
variable would take value zero, while it would take value 1 if the comment contained
it and its e ect went in one direction and 2 if the comment contained it but its e ect
went in the opposite direction. For example, the variable 	
 would take value 1 if
the subject expressed that her decision was motivated to avoid risk, while it would take
value 2 if it expressed that she was willing to take risks. The variable would take value
0 if risk was not mentioned.11
Second, our two independent research assistants (RAs) received instructions on how
to codify subjects’ comments into variables.12 RAs were not informed of the objective
of our study.13 They were explicitly told that their task was to capture and classify
what had been said rather than to interpret or rationalize subjects’ choices.14 Both RAs
worked separately and independently and only met at the time of receiving instructions.
There were no requirements on the number of variables used for each subject and RAs
were allowed to create new variables if they thought they were necessary, although
they did not do so. RAs returned two spreadsheets associating subjects’ comments to
variables.
No e ort was made to force agreement between coders. One of the coders was more
prone to classify comments into variables than the other. While coder 1 gave a positive
value to 843 entries (1362% out of 238   26 = 6188 entries), coder 2 gave a positive
value to 525 entries (848%). In any case, the degree of agreement between both coders
was relatively high. Taking the average over the value of all original ternary variables
for all subjects, both coders assigned the same value (0, 1 or 2)t o9226% of them.15
Coders never disagreed on the direction of the original ternary variables.
Once this information was collected, we duplicated the number of variables by
transforming the ternary variables (0, 1 or 2) into dummy variables (0 or 1) re ecting
the direction of the comment that the variable captures. For example, the variable
	
, became two variables: 	
1 (1 if wanting to avoid risk, 0 if it did not refer to
risk) and 	
2 (1 if wanting to take risks, 0 if it did not refer to risk).16
Our analysis below shows that this codi cation of subjects’ self-reports proved
useful in explaining subjects’ choices in the TD.
11Variables  and 	 were binary (0 or 1), as its content could not take di erent directions.
12The de ntion of variables and written instructions given to RAs can be found in Appendix C.
13The RAs hold a BSc in Physics (coder 1) and a BSc in Mathematics (coder 2). At the time, they
were enrolled in a PhD. program in Quantitative Finance.
14Our methods closely followed the methodology in Brandts and Cooper [4] and Cooper and Kagel
[11].
15Maximum agreement was reached in variables 
 and (100%) while minimum agreement
occurred in variable 	 (7017%).
16De nitions for the ternary variables appear in the Instructions for coders in Appendix C, and
from them it is inmediate to obtain the dummy variables.
7Descriptive statistics of subjects’ comments
Table 1 shows the percentage of subjects whose comments were re ected in our dummy
variables () at least according to one of the coders. The table contains a brief de-
scription of the meaning of the variables. Variables are classi ed in  ve groups. The
names used to describe these groups are only orientative and should help the reader,
but they were never used in the analysis.
CONCERNS includes variables referring to subjects’ motivations for their choices:
attitudes towards risk, loss aversion, aspiration levels, etc.
REASONING refers to subjects’ procedures to reach their decision: whether they
wrote calculations on their answer sheets, used economic theories to help them make a
decision, understood the game or thought they could reach a solution through logical
reasoning.
STRATEGY refers to own decisions: choosing the middle of the interval or one of
the extremes, undercutting the predicted rival’s choices, or choosing (or not) a high
value.
RIVALS refers to beliefs about rivals’ choices: whether they mentioned a possible
distribution for rivals’ choices or had point beliefs, thought their rival would choose a
high value, a higher value than their own, etc.
INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES includes variables re ecting equity consid-
erations, appreciation for fairness or desire to compete.
V a r i a b l e sw h i c hb o t hc o d e r st h o u g h tw e r ea b s e n tw e r ee l i m i n a t e d . 17 N o t i c et h a tn o
subject mentioned choosing a number due to it being “an equilibrium” neither explicit
equilibrium reasoning was found in subjects’ comments. No individual mentioned
imitating their rival. In contrast, some of them tried to coordinate —typically on 120.
There exists notable heterogeneity on the explanations given by subjects for their
choices in the TD. Some reasons were mentioned by a low percentage of subjects. We
eliminated from the following analysis those variables mentioned by less than 5% of
the subjects. This leaves us with the 23 variables that appear with a + sign in Table
1.18
17This was the case for variables 2, 	2, 
2, 
2, 2, 20_2, 120_2,a n d		2.
	2 was eliminated for being redundant.
18Qualitative results form the remaining of the paper were maintained when all variables were
included in the analysis.
8Table 1: Subjects Explanations of Own Choices in the td
 % Content  %C o n t e n t
CONCERNS STRATEGY
	
1 13.4+ Risk averse 1 19.3+ Average
	
2 4.6 Risk loving 2 5.5+ 6= Average
1 32.8+ Win zero averse 20_1 1.3 Focal Point 20
2 0.4 Win zero like 120_1 5.0+ Focal Point 120
1 9.7+ Win loving
2 1.3 Win aversion 1 1.7 Coordinate
1 10.5+ Undercut rival
1 6.3+ Penalty averse 1 5.0+ Undercut 1 unit
1 0.4 Penalty high 2 3.4 Undercut 1 unit
2 0.8 Penalty low 1 0.8 Undercut twice
	1 7.6+ Loss aversion 1 17.6+ Choice is low
2 5.0+ Choice is high
	1 7.6+ Aspiration low RIVALS
	2 5.0+ Aspiration high 1 28.6+ Probability beliefs
REASONING 2 0.4 Point beliefs
1 20.2+ Calculations  !1 14.7+ Beliefs high
 !2 2.5 Beliefs low
"!1 8.4+ Economic theory  !1 13.9+ Beliefs higher
 !2 0.4 Beliefs lower
#1 8.8+ Errors
1 2.9 Beliefs average
$2 0.8 Solvable 2 0.4 Beliefs not average
$1 6.3+ Unsolvable INTERDEPENDENT PREFERENCES
1 3.4 Equity
#%2 10.1+ Average is 70 &1 0.4 Fairness
#%1 4.2 Average not 70 2 12.2+ Competitive
As it is frequently argued in protocol analysis, our variables may just be a subset
of the reasons that could have in uenced subjects’ choices. In any case, there are a
number of arguments which were prominent and systematically repeated in subjects’
comments. Subjects’ main concerns were risk and earning no payo  (Risk1, Zero1)
and they also expressed a desire to “win” (Win1). A signi cant proportion of subjects
used mathematical calculations to come up with a choice (Calc1) and some of them
9mentioned the average of the interval (Ermean2). Among the most quoted strategies
were either choosing low or intermediate values and undercutting rivals’ choices (Low1,
Average1 and Cut1, respectively). With respect to opponents, many subjects provided
information about their subjective probability distribution on rivals’ choices (Prob1),
and/or stated beliefs indicating that rivals may choose high values or higher values than
their own (High1 and Higher1). Finally, subjects indicated a preference for earning
more than their rivals (Soci2). Notice that more altruistic forms of social preferences
such as fairness or equity concerns (Fair1, Soci1 ) were barely mentioned.19
Converting Variables into Indexes
To convert the above information into a more tractable data set, for each variable 
we created an index variable adding up the value of the dummies assigned by each of
the two coders (1() and 2()).
()=1()+2()
Our  variables take value 0 if no coder thought the subject’s comment referred
to such variable, value 1 if one of the coders thought it did and value 2 if both coders
thought the variable was mentioned. Given the lack of complete agreement among
coders, our index may be interpreted as re ecting the degree of intensity in the cod-
i cation of each variable. Out of a possible total of 5474 entries (238 subjects   23
dummy variables), there were 4823 zeros (881%), 435 one’s (79%)a n d216 two’s
(39%). An alternative would have been to have let data decide which of the two
coders was more e ective and use only such coder’s classi cation. However, we favour
having independent classi cations and a measure of intensity.
Next we explain how we turned the index variables into Principal Components
(PC).
Principal Components Analysis
Given the nature and length of our data set, the use of PC analysis was natural: )w e
were interested in summarizing the information obtained through codi cation in a more
tractable format; and ) several variables may have conveyed the same information.
F o re x a m p l e ,w ew e r eu n c e r t a i nap r i o r ya b o u tt h ep o s s i b l er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nloss
and risk aversion.
The most salient features of PC analysis are precisely that (1)i treduces the number
of variables and (2)i tdetects structure in the relationships between them, i.e., it
19This may be partially induced by using grade points as rewards which depend on the overall
relative performance across all experiments and tasks.
10classi es variables according to their content. We extracted 6 Principal Components
explaining 485% of the variance.20Appendix A shows the matrix of rotated components
with their saturation level.
Table 2 shows the indexes associated to each of the PCs and their saturation level.
We identi ed which indexes are predominant in each new PC through their saturation
level. Our selection criteria was to assign each original index to the component in
which it shows its highest value as long as this value is clearly highest for one PC.21
We assign an orientative name to each of the PCs (Name) and we brie y remind the
content of the indexes that form each PC (Explanation). The last column shows the
scoring of each index in its component and the direction of its participation (its sign).
20We did not prede ne the number of orthogonal components, rather we used as extraction criterion
an eigenvalue higher than 1 (   1); we also did not limit the number of computational iterations.
To study the signi cance of each component, we rotated the new variable using the Varimax-Kaiser
procedure. Initially we got nine components including three with only one variable which did not
contribute much in terms of interpretation or explained variance.
21Indexes Zero1, Theory1 and Nolog1, dissapear of the analysis as they score low and similar values
in more than one PC.
11Table 2: Indexes associated to principal components
PC Name Index Explanation Saturation
PC1 ' 1 Undercuts on rival 0.825
1 Undercuts 1 unit 0.709
 !1 Rival chooses higher 0.673
1 Uses probability 0.619
120_1 Rival chooses 120 0.562
 !1 Rival chooses high 0.560
PC2 		 2 Considers own choice as high 0.800
	2 Aspires to high value 0.692
PC3 % 2 Wants to earn more than rival 0.801
1 Wants to beat rival 0.760
PC4 	
 	 	1 Expects low value 0.663
	
1 Risk averse 0.634
1 Choice is low 0.503
	1 H a t e st oe a r nl e s st h a nr i v a l 0.395
PC5  #%2 Mean is 70 0.637
2 Chooses not mean 0.582
1 Chooses the mean 0.444
PC6  1 Penalty averse 0.454
1 Writes calculations -0.477
#1 Errors calculating payo s -0.653
The indexes grouped under each PC and presented in Table 2 suggest consistent
arguments for making a choice.22
The set of indexes contained in PC1 indicates that there is a number of subjects
who reason in terms of probability distributions on choices (1) and believe that
this distribution has more weight on high values ( !1,  !1 120_1). Given
these beliefs subjects show some level of iterative reasoning as they best respond by
Undercutting t h ec h o i c et h e ye x p e c tf r o mt h e i rr i v a l s( 1, 1).23
The second component, PC2, includes indexes re ecting high payo  aspirations
(	2) and, consequently high choices (2). We thus label this PC as Aspirations.
22Using a di erent number of PCs does not yield a di erent result. For example, with 9 PCs the
 rst four are identical and the  fth and sixth are very similar.
23Notice that subjects scoring high in PC1 justify their choices following a similar reasoning to the
L1 cognitive level as de ned by Stahl and Wilson [19], [20]. Few subjects justi ed their choices using
higher levels of iterative reasoning such as L2, since variables like Cut2, CutC2 and CutR2 were rarely
codi ed.
12PC3 re ects Competitive behavior. In particular, indexes scoring high in this PC
correspond to motivations such as earning more than rivals (2), or desire to beat
them (1).
PC4 refers to choices partly motivated by Risk aversion. Indexes scoring high in
this PC re ect desire to avoid risks (	
1, 	1) and thus, acknowledgement of low
values chosen (1) and low aspiration values (	1).
PC5 contains indexes related to comments made about the Average of the interval.
For example, stating its value (#%2) or justifying choices due to precisely being
in the average of the interval (1) or close to it, but not being the average
(2).
PC6 includes two types of variables: subjects who are averse to being penalized
(1) and subjects who make calculations (1)o rm a k em i s t a k e si nc a l c u l a t i n g
payo s (#1). There exist no clear a priory relationship among the indexes grouped
in this last PC.
Two important remarks concerning the interpretation of principal components:
) We interpret the components as types of behavior, in the sense that they represent
the revealed motivations driving subjects’ choices.
) Principal components and thus types, are uncorrelated. Although any subject
might exhibit a combination of these types, there exists no systematic relationship
among them.
As we later classify subjects according to the principal component in which they
score highest, let us have a clear prediction of the choice made by subjects classi ed
under each component.
PC1: Choices should be made in the high part of the interval, but should be lower
than the highest value ((120), as subjects undercut on their rival. Depending on the
exact expectation subjects may have on their rivals’ choice, their choice may be spread
along the interval. Undercutting behavior may thus contribute to the dispersion of
choices.
PC2: Choices made should be in the high part of the interval.
PC3: The indexes contained in this PC indicate that subjects should choose the
lowest possible number (20) in order to beat their rival and this earn more than her.
PC4: Since these subjects indicate their desire to avoid risk and loses and acknowl-
edge and expect to obtain low numbers, they should choose the lowest possible number
(20).
PC5: Choices made should be in the middle of the interval (70).
PC6: The prediction of the choice made by subjects classi ed under this component
is not so clear cut. Aversion to being penalized should drive subjects to make low
13choices, but other indexes in the PC do not allow to make clear predictions. As such,
we expect these choices to be spread along the interval.
Figure 3 below shows that these predictions were relatively well ful lled. Notice
that PC3 and PC4 predict the same choice as the unique Nash equilibrium of the TD.
Although people using equilibrium reasoning may be motivated by some of the variables
contained in this PCs, notice that no subject justi ed their choice with equilibrium
arguments.
In the next section we check whether the di erent types help us in predicting choices
in the TD.
4 Predicting TD choices through Principal Com-
ponents
We now check coherence between subjects’ comments, summarized in the PCs, and
their choices. Given the indexes contained in each of the PCs we conjecture that: )
PC1(Undercutting)a n dP C 2( Aspirations) have a positive impact on choices. )P C 3
(Competitive), PC4 (Risk Aversion)a n dP C 6( Penalty)h a v ean e g a t i v ei m p a c t .)
PC5 (Average)d r i v e sc h o i c e st o w a r d st h ea v e r a g eo ft h ei n t e r v a l .
Table 3 below shows the result of a Tobit censored regression of each subject’s
choice in the TD with the 6 principal components as regressors.
Table 3: PCs driving TD choices (N=238)
PC Name b )   
 5021 000
PC1 Undercutting 1247 000
PC2 Aspirations 1509 000
PC3 Competitive  1247 000
PC4 Risk Aversion  1876 000
PC5 Average 761 000
PC6 Penalty  1503 000
Notice that all PCs are signi cant (p-values of virtually 0 and have the expected
sign).
Figure 2 shows the di erences between actual and  tted choices. Interestingly, low
and intermediate values are better  tted than high ones, which are underestimated.
14Figure 2: Actual vs. Fitted choices
We now identify di erent types of subjects following their self-reported main moti-
vation for their choices in the TD. For each subject, we counted the number of indexes
showing a positive value in each PC. We then assign each subject to the PC in which
she scores highest. For example, according to our RAs, subject 3 scored a positive
value in 4 of the indexes contained in PC1 and 1 of the indexes in PC5. We thus
classify subject 3 as PC1. Although there are several ties, we are able to classify 144
subjects (60.5% of the subject pool) using this simple method. We focus only on these
cases. Table 4 below reports the percentage of the 144 subjects classi ed in each PC
along with their average choice in the TD and standard deviations. Very few of these
144 subjects were classi ed as PC2 and PC3. Notice that subjects classi ed in each
PC make on average choices which are consistent with the interpretation previously
given to each PC. High choices are taken on average by subjects classi ed as PC1 and
PC2, which constitute around one third of the subject pool. Choices around the mean
of the interval are taken on average by subjects classi ed as PC5, which are almost one
fourth of the subjects. Finally, low choices are made, as expected, by those subjects
classi ed as PC3, PC4, and PC6.
15Table 4: Subjects classified by PCs (N=144)
Subject Type Explanation % of Subjects Average Choice Standard *
PC1 Undercutting 29.17 83.48 29.54
PC2 Aspirations 2.08 100 20
PC3 Competitive 6.25 37 34.19
PC4 Loss Aversion 20.83 28.33 17.77
PC5 Average 23.61 67.46 9.76
PC6 Penalty 18.06 39.55 31.49
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the TD choices made by the 144 subjects classi ed
into the six PCs. Notice once again that the distributions tend to be concentrated
around the values one would expect from the indexes contained in each PC, although
as shown by the standard deviations there exist some dispersion, especially for PC1,
PC3 and PC6.
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17Overall, we have been able to identify di erent types of subjects whose heteroge-
neous choices in the TD are justi ed by heterogeneous reasons. Subjects self-reporting
similar reasons make similar choices which coincide with our initial conjectures. The
most important reasons driving choices in the TD are related to strategic and iterative
reasoning (PC1), high payo  aspirations (PC2), competitive preferences (PC3), atti-
tudes towards risk and losses (PC4) and focal points such as the average of the interval
(PC5).24 In the following section we check whether these identi ed types are consistent
with some of subjects’ personal characteristics and their choices in independent tasks
and experiments.
5 Type Coherence Across Tasks
The following variables were obtained from the same sample of subjects performing
di erent tasks in the experimental sessions detailed in Section 2. The number of
observations () was not the same across tasks, as some individuals were absent from
certain experimental sessions and some answers were erroneously reported in the session
containing the TD (June session).
We  rst describe the variables related to subjects’ personal characteristics
or attitudes:
Gender: Ad u m m yv a r i a b l e( 1=male, 2=female).
GRE: Subjects’ scores in a GRE-type math test containing 25 mathematics questions.
Self-evaluation: Proportion of correct answers subjects expected to get in the GRE-
type test.
Optimism: Average grade subjects expected to obtain in the second term exams
minus average grade obtained in the  rst term.
We now describe those variables which re ect subjects’ choices in other exper-
iments:
Sel sh: A dummy variable indicating how much subjects gave compared to the me-
dian of the subjects in their treatment playing the same dictator game (1=gave
less, 0=gave equal or more).25
24As previously mentioned, PC6 , which captures the lowest percentage of the variance, has a less
clear interpretation.
25We created this variable because di erent groups played dictator games with di erent initial
allocations.
18Risk-love: A variable in the interval [010] indicating how much a subject has to be
paid to avoid playing a 2x2 game with uncertain outcome. This variable may
re ect the degree of individuals’ strategic risk—love.
Lottery-aversion: A variable in the interval [01] which re ects the average degree
of risk—aversion showed by individuals playing four di erent lotteries.26
First we explore the correlations among the variables regarding personal charac-
teristics together with the Principal Components. Table 5 reports Pearson-+2 tests
among both types of variables. The number in parenthesis indicates p-values while the
number on brackets shows the number of observations available for each of the personal
characteristics. Numbers in bold indicate signi cant coe cients at upmost the 10%
level.
Table 5: Personal characteristics (+2 Correlations)
GRE Self-evaluation Optimism Gender
PC1 0.21 (0.00) 0.05 (0.38) 0.11 (0.14) -0.19 (0.00)
Undercutting [180] [224] [176] [238]
PC2 0.07 (0.30) 0.12 (0.06) 0.12 (0.10) -0.11 (0.08)
Aspirations [180] [224] [176] [238]
PC3 0.10 (0.17) 0.07 (0.25) -0.02 (0.79) -0.04 (0.50)
Competitive [180] [224] [176] [238]
PC4 -0.10 (0.16) -0.11 (0.09) 0.03 (0.65) 0.10 (0.10)
Risk aversion [180] [224] [176] [238]
PC5 -0.05 (0.47) 0.04 (0.55) 0.05 (0.44) 0.18 (0.00)
Average [180] [224] [176] [238]
PC6 0.01 (0.88) -0.02 (0.68) -0.00 (0.92) -0.04 (0.52)
Penalty [180] [224] [176] [238]
* (p-value) and [sample size].
Our GRE variable measures mathematical skills, which may be related to subjects’
analytical and cognitive abilities, and thus we may expect that subjects using more
cognitively demanding justi cations for their TD choices may be those who score high
i nt h eG R E - t y p em a t ht e s t . 27 Table 5 indicates that individuals’ math abilities are
positively correlated to PC1.
26As described in Brañas-Garza et al. [6].
27Notice that unercutting rivals’ choices is a cognitively demanding reasoning process according to
the literature on K-level thinking (starting with Stahl and Wilson [19], [20]).
19Self-evaluation may capture how con dent subjects feel about their abilities. Con-
 dent subjects may thus expect to obtain high payo s, and in particular they may
aspire to a high payo  in the TD. Therefore the positive relationship observed between
self-evaluation and PC2 (Aspirations) was to be expected. Additionally, the negative
correlation between self-evaluation and PC4 may indicate that con dent subjects are
not concerned about the strategic uncertainty in the TD, as they may feel assured they
will obtain high payo s.
Optimism may relate to the expectation of getting better outcomes than previously
obtained. This optimism may drive subjects to hold high aspirations in the TD, which
would explain the positive correlation between optimism and PC4.
Finally, we observe some Gender e ects. In the TD, men are more likely to undercut
their rivals (PC1) and have higher aspirations (PC2). On the contrary, women express
more concerns about risk (PC4) and tend to mention choosing values because of their
proximity to the average of the interval (PC5).
Now we check the possible relationship between choices in di erent experiments.
The heterogeneity observed in the di erent justi cations of subjects’ actions in the TD,
makes it an ideal candidate to study the translation of subjects’ motivations across
tasks. In such case, we would expect PCs to be able to capture subjects’ intrinsic
motivations not only in TD but in other experimental tasks, and thus there may exist
an intrinsic component in de ning types of subjects, which may not be completely task-
dependent. For example, we want to check whether those individuals mentioning risk
concerns in the TD are those behaving as risk averse when facing lotteries. Table 6
reports regressions of dictator game choices (sel shness), choices under uncertainty
involving strategic risk (risk-loving), and lottery choices (lottery-aversion)o nt h es i x
PCs obtained from the TD. Therefore, we should observe signi cant coe cients for
those PCs capturing the most relevant feature for each task.
Notice that the translation of the motivations captured by PCs to other tasks may
not be perfect. For example, subjects in the TD may have mentioned only a subset of
the motivations driving their choices. However, we should expect that self-reports may
reveal the most prominent motivation underlying TD choices, and thus, our exercise
may show meaningful results. Table 6 shows that most of the signi cant coe cients in
our regressions in Table 6 have the expected sign and are easy to interpret. Below we
discuss the signi cant coe cients for each of the PCs.
20Table 6: Predicting Actions
Sel shness Risk—love Lottery—aversion
probit tobit tobit
PC1 Undercutting -0.29 (0.75) 0.05 (0.58) -0.04 (0.00)
PC2 Aspirations 0.25 (0.01) -0.78 (0.46) 0.03 (0.02)
PC3 Competitive 0.07 (0.43) 0.08 (0.46) -0.00 (0.60)
PC4 Risk Aversion -0.03 (0.71) -0.23 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
PC5 Average -0.07 (0.46) 0.03 (0.77) 0.00 (0.70)
PC6 Penalty 0.04 (0.69) 0.09 (0.40) -0.00 (0.84)
C -0.44 (0.00) 5.40 (0.00) 0.48 (0.00)
 169 234 184
* (p-value).
The most salient results appear in bold in Table 6. We now describe a possible
interpretation of the results:
• Subjects reporting their choices were motivated by a desire to avoid risks (PC4)
are precisely those who also avoided strategic risk (risk-love). Consistently, they
are also those who are more risk averse (lottery-aversion).
• Subjects justifying their TD choices using arguments contained in PC1 (Under-
cutting)l e s sp r o n et ob u yinsurance in lotteries (lottery-aversion), which may be
related to the fact that those who choose high values in the TD may underesti-
mate the risk of obtaining bad outcomes. This same behavior would lead them
to buy less insurance in other uncertain situations such as lotteries.
• Subjects mentioning arguments contained in PC2 (Aspirations)a i m st oo b t a i na
high payo  in the TD. This same behavior would lead them to keep everything for
themselves in dictator games (sel shness). Such subjects are also more prone to
buy insurance (lottery-aversion), possibly also in order to maintain their payo s.
6D i s c u s s i o n
This paper starts by providing reasons behind observed heterogeneous behavior in one-
shot traveler’s dilemma experiments. We use subjects’ self-reported justi cations for
their behavior and we  nd that their claims turn out to be coherent and consistent
reasons for making di erent choices in the TD. Among the most prominent arguments,
we  nd that di erent levels of strategic sophistication, heterogeneous beliefs on oppo-
nents’ choices, payo s aspirations, competitive preferences, di erent degrees of risk and
21loss aversion and focal points such as the average of the interval are behind one-shot
choices in the TD.
Although self-reported explanations are obtained using no incentives and they may
only be a subset of the possible reasons leading to heterogeneous choices in the TD,
we  nd that they are useful in understanding behavior. Thus, our paper is in line
with recent experiments using a variety of sources easily available in the laboratory to
obtain higher explanatory power than relying only in choices made in the laboratory.
Similar recent approaches have successfully studied subjects’ sequence of payo  look-
ups to identify reasoning processes (Costa-Gomes and Crawford [12]), elicited beliefs
of opponents’ choices (see Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker [13]), recorded communication
among subjects (Brandts and Cooper [5]) or measure response-times (see Rubinstein
[18]) to explain laboratory behavior.
The traveler’s dilemma is an ideal game to study heterogeneous motivations behind
behavior since the typical distribution of choices is heterogeneous. However, if we want
to study how consistent those motivations are across di erent tasks, using only the
actions observed in a TD experiment might not be enough. The reason is that we show
that several di erent reasons may be behind the same TD choice. For example, we  nd
several subjects choosing the equilibrium strategy but none of them claim to be using
euqilibrium reasoning. Thus, using self-reported justi cations we are not only able to
better understand choices in the TD, but also to identify types of motivations behind
such choices.
Our second contribution consists in showing that some of such motivations are
intrinsic to subjects. Thus we observe that motivations are coherent with choices by
the same subjects in other tasks for which such motivations should be prominent.
Although our results are limited to the number of tasks and experiments available
using the same subjects, our paper is a  rst promising step towards identifying types
of subjects in a given population. We have shown that it may be possible to predict
subjects’ behavior in di erent tasks using subjects’ self-reported reasoning in other
tasks. Further research aiming to identify the relationship between di erent types of
individuals and their strategic behavior should follow.
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1 -0,065 0,013 -0,242 0,634 0,197 0,142
1 -0,021 -0,125 0,280 0,386 -0,351 0,302
1 -0,040 -0,048 0,098 0,076 -0,168 0,454
	1 0,018 -0,068 0,208 0,395 0,014 -0,018
1 0,048 -0,422 0,024 -0,090 -0,143 -0,477
"!1 0,198 -0,075 0,068 0,092 0,309 0,244
#1 -0,111 0,118 -0,018 0,124 -0,020 -0,653
1 0,619 0,197 0,071 0,121 0,262 -0,006
#%2 0,089 -0,170 -0,046 -0,074 0,637 -0,126
$1 -0,143 -0,108 -0,220 -0,308 -0,010 0,224
 !1 0,560 0,526 0,032 -0,010 -0,067 -0,048
 !1 0,673 0,099 0,053 0,105 0,114 0,021
1 0,825 -0,036 0,061 -0,086 -0,020 0,083
1 0,709 -0,120 -0,013 -0,115 -0,035 0,019
2 0,099 -0,066 0,801 0,002 0,145 0,017
1 -0,070 0,012 -0,344 -0,328 0,444 0,250
2 -0,077 0,040 0,160 0,042 0,582 -0,060
120_1 0,562 0,260 -0,020 -0,131 -0,275 -0,097
1 0,023 0,018 0,760 0,050 -0,012 0,145
	1 -0,010 -0,043 -0,124 0,663 -0,059 -0,055
	2 0,175 0,692 0,030 -0,088 -0,111 -0,132
1 -0,132 -0,053 0,288 0,503 -0,164 0,071
2 0,013 0,800 -0,090 -0,070 -0,038 -0.041
25Appendix B: Experimental Instructions
NAME: _______________________
ID: _______________________
TASK 3: Your performance in this task DOES count for your grade in Micro I.
In this test you must decide on prices. Assume that YOU are a  rm competing in
a market with only two  rms. Now we will explain to you who is the other  rm and
what your task is.
Your competitor is a clasmate in your Micro I section. The matching will be made
such that everyone has a single partner.
Task : You must  x a price in the interval [ 20, 120 ], both extremes included. Since
you compete with a rival  rm you must consider that:
• If the other company  xes a price lower than yours, then you will earn what the
other has  xed minus a 20 point penalty (she will earn her price plus 20 extra
points).
• if the other company  xes a price higher than yours, then you will earn what you
have  xed plus 20 extra points (she will earn your price minus a 20 point penalty
• if both prices coincide then BOTH of you will earn the price you have  xed.
The price that I choose is: ____
You can use the following space for whatever you may need. Please indicate how
you have come up with your decision.
Appendix C: Instructions to Classi ers
Your task consists in classifying the comments made by the 242 subjects who partic-
ipated in the experiment. We have created the variables listed below and you must
codify the written information provided by subjects in these variables. Your task does
not consist in interpreting why the subjects write what they write, but only in ac-
curately attesting what they write. Our objective is to  nd out regularities on what
subjects write, so please be careful when classifying comments, you should re ect only
what subjects wrote.
T h ef o r m sa r ei nt h es a m eo r d e rt h a tt h en a m e si nt h eE x c e l  l ey o uw i l lb ew o r k i n g
on. Please, start by reading the name of the subject and his/her comment. Next, move
along the row corresponding to that subject and  ll up the cells you think should be
 lled.
26You must use "ones" (1) and "twos" (2) to  ll up the cells, according to the expla-
nation for each variable provided below. In the cases in which the subject’s comments
do not convey any information on a particular variable, please do not change the entry
in the corresponding cell (leave the "zero").
Consider the cells as independent:  lling up a cell with a number does not imply
anything about the number you enter in another cell.
Finally, you can add columns of variables if you think that our variables do not
allow you to re ect what a subject writes. In that case, please, write your codi cation
system in a Word document similar to the table "VARIABLES" shown below.
Please, before you start reading subjects’ comments, have a look at the list of
variables and their codi cation below. You will need to check the codi cation again
while you  ll up the Excel  le, specially with the  rst subjects. Please, be patient and
do it carefully.
The instructions of the experiment appear in each subjects’ forms. Please, before
you start make sure that you understand the experiment and the payo  mechanism.




Explanation: Does not like / Does not want to take risks
“1” if: S a y sd o e sn o tw a n t/ d o e sn o tl i k et ot a k er i s k s/ t a k e sad e c i s i o nb e c a u s e
implied risk is low or moderate
“2” if: Says wants / likes taking risks
Leave “0” if: Does not mention this issue
Zero D
Explanation: Does not want to earn zero points / Wants to earn a positive number
of points
“1” if: Says wants to avoid earning zero points / Wants to earn a positive number
of points
“2” if: Says wants to earn zero points
Leave “0” if: Does not mention this issue
Penalty E
Explanation: Wants to avoid being penalized
“1” if: Says wants to avoid being penalized
27“2” if: Says wants to be penalized
Leave “0” if: Does not mention this issue
Lose F
Explanation: Wants to avoid having less points than rival
“1” if: Says does not want to lose / to have less points than the rival
“ 2 ”i f :S a y sw a n t st ol o s e/t oh a v el e s sp o i n t st h a nt h er i v a l
L e a v e“ 0 ”i f :D o e sn o tm e n t i o nt h i si s s u e
Size G
Explanation: Decision depends on size of the penalty
“1” if: Says penalty is "high" and that it a ects decision
“2” if: Says penalty is "low" and that it a ects decision
Leave “0” if: Does not mention this issue
Calc H
Explanation: Writes calculations on sheet
“1” if: There are calculations written on sheet
Leave “0” if: There are no calculations on sheet
Theory I
Explanation: Gives an economic explanation of decision
“1” if: Comment explains an economic theory (correct or not) /talks about  rms/
uses terms like "undercutting", etc.
“2” if: Comment does not contain economic theories or about how  rms compete,
etc.
Leave “0” if: Does not mention this issue
Error J
Explanation: Makes mistakes when calculating payo s
“1” if: Comments show subject does not understand payo  mechanism
Leave “0” if: Understands payo  mechanism or it is not possible to infer whether
the payo  mechanism has been understood
Prob K
Explanation: Thinks that the rival can choose di erent values
“1” if: Says that certain values will be chosen with probability / are likely / most
probably / a high percentage of times /in the majority of cases
"2" if: Says that rival will choose some value for sure
Leave "0" if: Does not say anything about the probability of values chosen by
rival
28Ermean L
Explanation: Does not know how to calculate the interval ’s mean
“1” if: Says mean is di erent from 70
"2" if: Says mean is 70
Leave "0" if: Does not mention the value of the interval’s mean
Nolog M
Explanation: Does not think it is possible to choose using reasoning
“1” if: Says it is not possible to choose using reasoning / chooses randomly
“2” if: Says it is possible to choose using reasoning
Leave “0” if: Does not mention “reasoning”
High N
Explanation: Thinks rival will choose a high value
“1” if: Says rival will choose a high value
“2” if: Says rival will choose a low value
Leave "0" if: Does not mention rival’s value
Higher O
Explanation: Thinks that rival will choose higher value than self
“1” if: Says rival will choose higher value than self
"2" if: Says rival will choose lower value than self
Leave “0” if: Does not mention rival’s value
Cut P
Explanation: Chooses a value lower than what that thinks rival will do
"1" if: Says “undercuts” what thinks rival will do
"2" if: S a y sc h o o s e ss a m ea sr i v a l
Leave “0” if: Does not mention rival’s value
CutC P
Explanation: Chooses a value lower than rival’s expected value
"1" if: Says chooses just one unit less than rival’s expected value
"2" if: Says chooses a somewhat lower value (5, 12, "a little lower") than rival’s
expected value
Leave “0” if: Does not mention value rival will choose
CutR Q
Explanation: Thinks rival will undercut and undercuts even more
"1" if: Says undercuts just one unit to the rival’s undercut value
29"2" if: Says chooses a somewhat lower value (5, 12, "a little lower") than rival’s
undercut value
Leave "0" if: Does not mention rival’s value
Fair S
Explanation: Chooses a value for being "fair"
“1” if: Says choice is motivated to make payo  distribution fair / talks about
"fairness"
"2" if: Says choice is motivated to make payo  distribution unfair
Leave “0” if: Does not mention payo  distribution fairness
Soci T
Explanation: Cares about rival´s payo s
“1” if: Says wants both players to earn more or less the same
“2” if: Wants to earn more than rival
Leave “0” if: Does not mention payo  distribution
Average O
Explanation: Chooses an average value
“1” if: Says chooses a value so that it is average (or intermediate)
"2" if: Says chooses a value for not being the average (above, below...)
Leave “0” if: Does not mention choosing average value or not
AverageR V
Explanation: Rival /Rivals will choose average value
“1” if: Says rivals will probably choose/on average an average value
“2” if: Says believes rivals will choose /probably/ on average another value
Leave "0" if: Does not mention rival’s value
20 W
Explanation: Rival /Rivals will choose 20
"1" if: Says rival will choose /probably/ on average 20
"2" if: Says thinks rivals will choose /probably/ on average another value
Leave "0" if: Does not mention rival’s value
120 X
Explanation: Rival /Rivals will choose 120
"1" if: Says rival will choose /probably/ on average 120
"2" if: Says thinks rivals will choose /probably/ on average another value
Leave "0" if: Does not mention rival’s value
30Coord Y
Explanation: Wants to coordinate with rival
“1” if: S a y sw a n t st oc o o r d i n a t ev a l u ew i t hr i v a l ´ s
"2" if: Says does not want to coordinate value with rival´s
Leave "0" if: Does not refer to coordination
Win Z
Explanation: Wants to beat rival
“1” if: Says wants to beat rival
“2” if: S a y sd o e sn o tw a n tt ob e a tr i v a l
Leave “0” if: Does not mention whether wants to win or not
Aspi AA
Explanation: Aims to / Expects / Accepts a value
“1” if: Says aims to low value
"2" if: Says aims to high value
Leave “0” if: Does not mention aspirations
Low AB
Explanation: C o n s i d e r so w nv a l u et ob el o w
“1” if: Says own value is low
“2” if: Says own value is high
Leave “0” if: Does not mention the size of own value
31Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics
Mean st. dev Min. Max. n
TD choice 58.22 32.66 20 120 238
Gender 1.54 * 1 2 238
Sel shness 0.33 * 0 1 169
Self-evaluation 0.41 0.20 0 1 224
Optimism 0.15 0.90 -4 3 176
Risk-love 5.39 1.63 0 10 234
Lottery-aversion 0.48 0.21 0 1 186
GRE 29.94 15.10 -7 72 180
PC1 0 1 -1.39 4.34 238
PC2 0 1 -2.16 5.31 238
PC3 0 1 -1.60 4.25 238
PC4 0 1 -1.73 4.24 238
PC5 0 1 -2.09 4.69 238
PC6 0 1 -3.68 2.43 238
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